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Abstract
We provide a metalinguistic formalization of calculational logic, an alternative to
higher-order logic for escaping the restrictions of first-order logic. We show that con-
ventional semantic techniques can provide an adequate foundation for calculational
logic, even its atypical metalinguistic features.
1 Introduction
The calculational approach to predicate logic represents an alternative to higher-order logic
for escaping the restrictions of first-order logic. It combines selected aspects of metamathe-
matics and standard predicate logic (with equality and function symbols) in a single, formal
system. It also presents the challenge of justifying its atypical metalinguistic features; for
instance, calculational logic is intended to reason about textual substitution, but a conven-
tional first-order semantics does not accommodate substitution. In this paper, we demon-
strate that a conventional metalinguistic semantics can provide an adequate foundation for
the purposefully non-standard language of calculational logic. In addition, we enumerate
the non-standard elements of the language of the calculational logic of [1]. We conclude that,
although calculational proofs may seem unusual and highly heuristic, the fundamental infer-
ences of calculational logic seem quite straightforward in the context of our metalinguistic
explanation, and they can be readily justified by conventional methods.
Typically, logicians are formal in their description of first-order predicate logic (with
equality and function symbols) but informal in their use of metalanguage to describe prop-
erties of first-order logic, even when applying the metalanguage to show some formula is a
1http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/aaron. Supported by NSF grant GER-9454149.
2http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/sfa. Supported by DARPA grant EIA-9812630.
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theorem, as in [3]. For example, the following metatheorem,
The universal quantification (∀x)x = e ⇒ P , where x does not occur free in expression
e, is equivalent to P [x := e].
(1)
is generally stated in English and would be proved informally, if at all. (Here P [x := e]
denotes a copy of formula P in which each free occurrence of x is replaced by expression
e in the usual capture-avoiding fashion.)
In the calculational approach to logic as presented in [1] —see also the IPL issue [4],
which is devoted to this approach— such metatheorems are written in a formal notation as
if they were part of an extended first-order predicate logic. For example, (1) is treated as
an axiom:
One-point rule: Provided x does not occur free in e, ((∀x)x = e ⇒ P ) ≡ P [x := e].(2)
The calculational predicate logic in [1] is designed to permit formal reasoning about met-
alinguistic operations such as P [x := e] , so its proofs incorporate both metamathematical
manipulation and traditional predicate logic steps. However, calculational logic systems
developed thus far have not been provided the kind of theoretical, formal foundation that
is needed in order to be sure that the systems are technically correct. The purpose of this
paper is to provide such a foundation.
To illustrate the use of the calculational approach, we provide an example of the kinds of
properties that can be easily expressed and proved. Consider, first, the following statement
about integer arithmetic:
∑10
i=2 2i =
∑8
j=0 2(j + 2),
which in the calculational notation of [1] is written as
(+i 2 ≤ i ≤ 10 : 2i) = (+j 0 ≤ j ≤ 8 : 2(j + 2)).
(Thus, the range of dummy i appears between “ ” and “ : ”, and the expression being
“accumulated” appears after “ : ”.) The metatheorem that justifies this equality is rarely
stated. But in [1], it is given explicitly and concisely as:
Change of dummy: Provided ¬occurs(“j”,“R, P”) and function f has an inverse,
(+i R : P ) = (+j R[i := f(j)] : P [i := f(j)]).
(3)
The syntactic condition ¬occurs(Vs,Es) is true exactly when no variable on list Vs occurs
free in any expression on list Es .
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Furthermore, in [1], the theorem is stated in terms of a general operator ∗ instead of the
addition operator + ; the theorem holds for various binary operators ∗ that are associative,
symmetric, and have an identity. (We do not claim here that it holds for all such binary
operators, because we do not know a semantics for infinite iteration in general; we restrict
∗ to ∨ and ∧ for the purposes of this paper.)
This theorem and its proof (Fig. 1, taken verbatim from [1]) incorporate many features
of the calculational approach. The theorem is not only succinctly and formally stated, it
is also succinctly and memorably proved. By memorable, we mean that at each step in
developing the proof, the form of the proof practically determines the next step; there is no
need for tricks or mnemonics, the proof’s form itself is a guide to its construction.
The proof of Theorem Change Of Dummy also integrates the primary notational and
mathematical novelties of the calculational predicate logic in [1], non-standard aspects such
as a generalized treatment of quantification, formal reasoning about textual substitution,
formal reasoning about syntactic properties such as free occurrences of variables in expres-
sions, and a proof format that leaves many inferences implicit. Because of this, we chose this
proof as a concrete example to help illustrate our metalinguistic foundation for calculational
predicate logic. In the next section, we introduce and motivate our metalinguistic reading
of this proof.
In later sections, we give a complete, technical exposition of our formal foundation,
applying it to explain the particular component propositions of the Change of Dummy
proof as well as other aspects of the calculational logic presented in chapters 3, 8, and 9 of
the discrete mathematics textbook [1].
2 An Example Metalinguistic Explanation
The proof of Change of Dummy shown in Fig. 1 is a chain of seven equalities, where each
equality is justified using inference rule “substitution of equals for equals” (called Leibniz
in [1]). In English, this inference rule is: if X = Y is a theorem, then so is P = Q , where
Q is the result of replacing some occurrences of X in P by Y . For example, the first
line of the proof of Change of Dummy is P , the third line is Q , and the second line gives
the premise X = Y (within braces “ 〈 ” and “ 〉 ”). In this case, the premise is the instance
(∗x x = f.y : P ) = P [x := f.y] of axiom One-point rule.
The transitivity of equality-derivability —known simply as “Transitivity” in [1]— is an
inference rule of calculational logic. (Informally, the rule states that if A = B and B = C
are theorems under the same conditions, so is A = C ; we will be more precise about what
this means later in the paper.) Using it six times, we conclude that the formula on the first
line of the proof equals the formula on the last line.
This calculational system is quite different from conventional predicate logics. First,
it relies heavily on inference rule substitution of equals for equals, instead of modus po-
nens. More importantly, it extends a conventional first-order language by incorporating
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Theorem Change of Dummy. Provided ¬occurs( “ y ” , “ R, P ” ) and function f has
an inverse, (∗x R : P ) = (∗y R[x := f.y] : P [x := f.y]) .
Proof. We start with the right side of (∗x R : P ) = (∗y R[x := f.y] : P [x := f.y]) and
show it is equal to the left side.
(?y R[x := f.y] : P [x := f.y])
= 〈One-point rule (8.14)
—Quantification over x has to be introduced. The One-
point rule is the only theorem that can be applied at first.〉
(?y R[x := f.y] : (?x x = f.y : P ))
= 〈Nesting (8.20) —Moving dummy x to the outside
gets us closer to the final form.〉
(?x, y R[x := f.y] ∧ x = f.y : P )
= 〈Substitution (3.84a) — R[x := f.y] must be removed
at some point. This substitution makes it possible.〉
(?x, y R[x := x] ∧ x = f.y : P )
= 〈R[x := x] ≡ R ; Nesting, ¬occurs( “ y ” , “ R ” )
—Now we can get a quantification in x alone.〉
(?x R : (?y x = f.y : P ))
= 〈 x = f.y ≡ y = f−1.x —This step prepares for the
elimination of y using the One-point rule.〉
(?x R : (?y y = f−1.x : P ))
= 〈One-point rule (8.14)〉
(?x R : P [y := f−1.x])
= 〈Definition of textual substitution — ¬occurs( “ y ” , “ P ” ) 〉
(?x R : P )
Figure 1: Proof of Theorem Change of Dummy. Details of the cited premises One-point
rule (8.14), Nesting (8.20), and Substitution (3.84a) are present in section 7.
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elements that are typically accounted for as metamathematics about the logic. This can be
seen even in Theorem Change of Dummy itself: the notation for textual substitution —a
metamathematical concept— appears in what is purported to be a formula of the logic.
In light of this, a metalinguistic reading of the proof seems like the simplest way to
explain it. The theorems and proofs in calculational logic are not typical predicate logic
theorems and proofs; they are metatheorems and metaproofs about theorems and proofs in
a typical predicate logic.
To arrive at this conclusion, we need to formalize and thus understand this calculational
system in a more precise manner than is done in [1]. We begin by defining a first-order
predicate logic that we call the object language. The object language does not contain
metamathematical concepts like substitution. Its purpose is only to serve as as a concrete
object level for the metalinguistic development that follows.
Second, we formalize the data language, so named because it represents the actual data
that users manipulate when stating or proving theorems in [1]. In the data language,
expressions may be object-expression valued. For example, a variable P in the data language
might range over expressions of the object language, and data-level expressions like P ∧Q
would be object-expression valued, denoting the object-language expression constructed by
applying the object-level conjunction operator to the object expressions denoted by P and
Q . The other signs for logical operators of our first-order object language are represented
in the data language in a similar fashion.
We can illustrate the difference between object language and data language using two
expressions that appear to stand for function application in Theorem Change of Dummy.
First, consider the expression f.y , a data-language level term. f and y are variables in
the data language; they are not themselves a function and an argument. Instead, f.y de-
notes ApO(f ; y) , the object-level term constructed by the object-level function application
operator ApO and the object expressions referred to by f and y . That is, the data-level
expression f.y is object-expression valued. The data-level variable f does not range over
data-level functions, but object expressions.
Now consider the expression occurs( “ x ” , “ P ” ) , which is intended to have the meaning
“each variable in list x (of variables) occurs free in at least one expression in list P (of
expressions)”. In [1], the two arguments of occurs are quoted in order to make clear that
the arguments are not the values of x and P but the lists of variables and expressions
themselves. However, at the data-language level, we write this simply as occurs(x, P ) ,
where x is a term that stands for a list of object-language variables and P is a term that
stands for a list of object expressions. The boolean-valued expression occurs(x, P ) then
works in the ordinary way, applying function occurs to the terms x and P . It does not
denote an object-level term the way f.y does in the above paragraph.
Similarly, the (inherently metalinguistic) textual substitution operation E[V := P ] is an
object-expression valued operation in the data language. With data-level variables E, V, P
referring to object expression e , list of object variables vs , and list of object expressions ps ,
respectively, E[V := P ] denotes an object expression: a copy of e where all free occurrences
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in e of the variables on vs have been replaced by the corresponding expressions on ps using
simultaneous, capture-avoiding substitution.
With this introduction, we are ready to begin defining the object language and then the
data language.
3 The Object Language
The design of the object language should be broad enough to include the fundamental forms
on which the abstractions of the data language are built as well as general enough to be
expanded to accommodate other aspects (i.e., other than predicate logic) of the calculational
approach to discrete mathematics in [1]. In the object language, we present a predicate logic
in which each model contains a domain of discourse, a typing environment, and a valuation.
Throughout,
 
denotes the set { False , True } .
3.1 Object language syntax
Definition. OV is a denumerable class of object variables —identifiers used in the
object language as propositional variables, predicate symbols, function symbols, and
variables over individuals. As in ordinary informal practice, we make no syntactic
distinction between quantifiable variables and propositional variables, or indeed be-
tween these and uninterpreted function and predicate symbols. Such distinctions will
be introduced with typing environments in section 3.2 on object language semantics.
(4)
Definition. OE is the class of object expressions, consisting of the object variables
in OV, the constant fO, and all instances of the distinct operations ApO(E1; E2),
E1 ⇒O E2, E1 =O E2, and (∀Ox.E1), where E1, E2∈OE and x∈OV.
(5)
ApO is intended to stand for function application. We express multi-place predicates and
functions by currying with ApO . For example, an application of two-place predicate P to
E1 and E2 would be ApO(ApO(P ; E1); E2) . The infix operator =O stands for equality.
Note that, as in [1], equality is applied to both individual and propositional expressions.
Definition. We also introduce the following useful syntactic abbreviations:(6)
• ¬OP == P ⇒O fO
• tO == ¬OfO
• P ∧O Q == ¬O(P ⇒O ¬OQ)
• P ≡O Q == (P ⇒O Q) ∧O (Q ⇒O P )
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• P ∨O Q == ¬OP ⇒O Q
• ∃Ox.P == ¬O(∀Ox.¬OP )
We use standard conventions for parenthesization with well-understood connectives.
The Gries & Schneider text [1] treats quantifiers in a more complex and abstract manner
than is represented above. It is not necessary to build this into our object syntax; we discuss
it more fully in a later section.
In fact, it barely matters what the object syntax is. The choice of primitive operators
for the object language presented here was not implicit from the logic in [1], and the method
of inference we aim to explain does not work directly on object expressions at all, but on a
metalanguage about object expressions. We chose this particular object language only for
concreteness of example.
3.2 Object language semantics
The semantics of the object language is given with respect to a domain of individuals D ,
over which we define quantification.
Definition. The types of values that object (sub)expressions may denote have the
forms
D(n) → D or D(n) →
 
where (for A∈{D,
 
}) D(0) → A is A and D(n + 1) → A is D → (D(n) → A). That
is, D(n) → A is the type of curried n-ary A-valued functions.
We let K(D) be the collection of all these types D(n) → A, for A∈{D,
 
}.
(7)
Definition. A model of the object language is a triple 〈D, σ, V 〉 where(8)
• D , a domain of discourse, is a non-empty collection of values.
• σ:OV → K(D) is a typing environment function that assigns a type in K(D) to
every object variable.
• V :(Πx:OV. σ(x)) is a valuation function; the binding Π notation allows us to express
that it assigns a value from type σ(x) to each variable x .
So, a model consists of a domain and an assignment of types and values to variables. Where
assignments to variables are concerned, we use superscripts and subscripts to represent
updating. For instance, for valuation V , V xd is the same as V except it assigns d to
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variable x . We also follow this convention for typing environments and other objects
throughout the paper.
We now define a relation Osem to give the semantics of object expressions.
Definition. For a domain of individuals D, typing environment σ:(OV → K(D)),
valuation V :(Πx:OV. σ(x)), e:OE, T :K(D), and v:T , we recursively define Osem by
the clauses below, where P, Q∈OE. We intend Osem(D, σ, V, e, v, T ) to hold exactly
when expression e has type T and value v∈T under model 〈D, σ, V 〉.
To simplify notation, we elide the arguments D, σ, V from an Osem(· · ·) expression
where it is obvious what is meant. In clauses where these terms are directly manip-
ulated, they are included. We also treat each clause in the definition as closed by
universally quantifying over any apparently free variables.
(9)
1. ∀x:OV. Osem(x, V (x), σ(x))
2. Osem(ApO(P ; Q), F (a), T ) if Osem(P, F, D → T ) and Osem(Q, a, D) .
3. Osem(fO , False ,
 
) .
4. Osem(P ⇒O Q, q if p,
 
) if Osem(P, p,
 
) and Osem(Q, q,
 
) .
5. Osem((∀Ox. P ), (∀d:D. g(d)),
 
) if ∀d:D. Osem(σxD , V
x
d , P, g(d),
 
) .
6. ∀T :{D,
 
}, p:T, q:T. Osem(P =O Q, p = q,
 
) if Osem(P, p, T ) and Osem(Q, q, T ) .
This semantics has a typical form, although some of its features are not usually encoun-
tered in the language of a first-order predicate logic. Here, we offer a few brief explanatory
notes.
Clause 1 reflects our decision to allow any identifiers to be used with any type; typing is
assigned by σ . This formalizes the practice in [1], which seems practical and natural.
Clause 2 stipulates that the object language sign for function application denotes actual
function application (similarly for the usual boolean functions related to clauses 3-5). Note
that clauses 1 and 2 can be applied to expressions of various function types, while the other
clauses can be applied only to boolean or individual-valued expressions.
Clause 6 is unusual for first-order predicate logic because it allows equalities between
booleans as well as between individuals. This is persistently exploited by the methods of
calculational logic in order to apply equality lemmas and rules to equivalences (bicondition-
als). Note that the only difference between P =O Q and P ≡O Q is that the latter has a
value only when its arguments have boolean values.
Despite its few novelties, the object language is sensible in standard ways, as exemplified
by the following theorems, whose straightforward proofs we omit.
Theorem. Osem(D, σ, V, e, v, T ) defines v as a partial function of the other argu-
ments. That is, Osem(e, v, T ) ⇒ Osem(e, v′, T ) ⇒ v = v′.
(10)
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The above theorem was a design goal for the definition. It also happens that Osem defines
type T as a partial function of the arguments other than T and v , but we might reasonably
choose to extend the language to one that is “polymorphic” with respect to types. We
might introduce elements with multiple types, such as a nil element if we used list types, or
a constant that for each function type stands for the identity function on that type. Or, we
might introduce types with common values, such as  and  . All of these are reasonable
extensions if we were to include more of the discrete mathematics of [1] in our metalinguistic
framework.
Theorem. Textual substitution is semantically equivalent to updating environments.
That is, Osem(σ, V, GxE , v, T ) iff Osem(σ
x
T ′ , V
x
d , G, v, T ) and Osem(σ, V, E, d, T
′).
(11)
Theorem. Only free variables affect the value of a term: for any term E, If two
models agree on all free variables in E and E has a value in one of the models, then
E has the same value in the other model.
(12)
Theorem. Change of bound variables preserves value: for any object expression G, if
G has a value in a model, then G′ has the same value, where G′ is G under a renaming
of bound variables.
(13)
4 Object-Level Theoremhood
Our data language is directly about the theoremhood of expressions in an object language
such as the one we defined. As part of the subject matter of the data language, we develop
an appropriate notion of object-level theoremhood by defining a class of object theorems
with respect to assumptions α . That is, we define a derivability relation
() α ` P
where conclusion P is an object expression, α is a list of object expressions, and  is a
type expression assignment function (which we will soon describe precisely). In this section,
we present a little language of type expressions, define object-level derivability, and discuss
its relation to the data language.
4.1 Type expressions
We formulate object theoremhood with respect to type expression assignments. Type expres-
sions are syntactic elements that we interpret as types; for a domain D , type expressions
refer to types in K(D) .
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Formally, the class OT of object type expressions consists of the pairs (n)r , where n ∈ 
and r is one of {bool, ind} (standing for the ground types of booleans and individuals).
The semantics for these simple expressions is an interpretation into K(D) :
• [(n)bool]D = D(n) →
 
• [(n)ind]D = D(n) → D
Note that we interpret type expressions as types only in the context of a domain D , but
we commonly elide the understood subscript D . In addition, for simplicity, we write (n)r
as r in cases where n is 0 .
A type expression assignment  is a function in OV → OT . For type expression assign-
ment  , we let []D be the corresponding type assignment, eliding D when understood.
That is, for object variable x , [].x is [.x] under the above semantics for type expressions.
Thus, for simplicity’s sake, we may establish properties in terms of either type expression
assignments or typing environments, but we also consider them established in terms of the
other through this correspondence.
We further define the assignment of type expressions to object expressions under  as
the strongest relation () A :: T that satisfies the following clauses. (We elide the type
expression assignment when it is just  .)
1. ∀x:OV. x :: (x)
2. ∀r:{bool, ind}. ApO(A; B) :: (n)r if A :: (n + 1)r and B :: ind
3. fO :: bool
4. A ⇒O B :: bool if A :: bool and B :: bool
5. (∀Ox : A) :: bool if (
x
ind) A :: bool
6. ∀r:{bool, ind}. A =O B :: bool if A :: r and B :: r
This definition follows the form of the clauses of the object language semantics. For no-
tational convenience, we also extend type expression assignment to multiple expressions:
() α :: T is defined as ∀A ∈ α. () A :: T .
4.2 Definition of object-level theoremhood
The purpose of theoremhood (derivability) is to pick out a usefully large but effectively
recognizable subclass of valid expressions, doing so without referring to the semantics. We
express this in a semantic constraint on derivability (which we will not prove here)
∀:OV → OT.(() α ` P ) ⇒ valid(, α ⇒ P )
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where valid(, Q) iff for any domain D and valuation V such that 〈D, [], V 〉 is a model,
Osem([], V, Q, True,
 
) . We also use α ⇒ P as iteration of implication over antecedent
lists, e.g., a1, a2, a3 ⇒ P is a1 ⇒ a2 ⇒ a3 ⇒ P . Since () α ` P depends on the
values of  only on variables that occur free in α or P , the fact that the domain of  is
infinite does not prevent effective recognizability of theoremhood.
There is a noteworthy similarity between our motivation for choosing a particular def-
inition of the object language and our motivation for choosing a particular definition of
object-level derivability. Recall that, in many ways, the details of our particular choice of
object language is of little consequence to the data language. Similarly, although a sensi-
ble set of object theorems is a necessary foundation for the metatheorems established by
calculational logic, the data language and users of its inference methods remain generally in-
sulated from any particularities of the definition of the object theorem set. The metalogical
approach of [1] emphasizes the data language forms of inference about object theoremhood
and de-emphasizes the details about how the class of object theorems is defined. Therefore,
using (and justifying) calculational logic does not require any particular definition of an
object theorem set.
Nonetheless, to have a concrete example to refer to when discussing object-level deriv-
ability, we present a definition of object theoremhood; it is not the only possible adequate
definition. Our set of object language theorems satisfies the above semantic constraint (we
omit the proof) and contains the theorems of a traditional predicate logic. We adopt a few
conventions for notational simplicity: when we elide the type expression assignment, as in
α ` P , it is  ; P [x := A] denotes capture-avoiding textual substitution; P cbv Q means
that P and Q are related by mere change of bound variables.
Definition. We define object theoremhood, () α ` P , for :OV → OT, α:OE List,
P :OE, as the strongest relation satisfying the following clauses:
(14)
1. α ` P if P ∈ α and α :: bool
2. α ∪ {A} ` P if α ` P and A :: bool
3. α ` Q if α ` P ⇒O Q and α ` P
4. α ` P ⇒O Q if α ∪ {P} ` Q
5. α ` P if α ` P ′ and P cbv P ′
6. α ` P [x := A] if α ` (∀Ox.P ) and A :: ind
7. α ` P if α ` (∀Ox.P ) and ¬(x free in P )
8. α ` (∀Ox.P ) if (
x
ind) α ` P and ¬(x free in α)
9. α ` P if α ` fO and P :: bool
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10. ∀r:{bool, ind}. α ` P [x := B] if α ` P [x := A] and α ` A =O B and A, B :: r and
(xr ) P :: bool
11. ∀r:{bool, ind}. α ` A =O A if A :: r and α :: bool
12. α ` A =O B if α ` A ≡O B
Most of the clauses correspond to expected elimination and introduction forms for operators
in a natural deduction style for sequents: clauses 3 and 4 are elimination and introduction
for implication; clauses 6 and 8 are elimination and introduction for quantification over
individuals; clause 9 is false-elimination (there is no false-introduction); clauses 10 and 11
are elimination and introduction for equality, with both boolean and individual expressions
permitted as the equands.
We comment briefly on the other clauses:
• Clauses 1 and 2 embody generic facts about assumptions.
• Clause 5 admits change of bound variables as an inference. While typically derivable,
it is not worth the trouble to derive. Combinations of clauses 3, 4, and 5 permit
change of bound variables on hypotheses.
• Clause 7 entails the existence of individuals (elements of the domain), making ∃Ox.tO
derivable even when :OV → OT assigns bool to all variables; all the other clauses
are valid even for the empty domain. In fact, clause 7 would be a special case of clause
6 if only there were an individual-type expression for every  . Indeed, in formulations
of predicate calculus in which each variable has a syntactically fixed type (equivalent
to our fixing  for our entire formulation), there are always individual-type variables.
In our formulation, however, any variable may be assigned any type, and there are no
individual-type constants.
• Clause 12 has many effects. It makes possible the proof of non-trivial equalities on
propositional arguments. Indeed, it establishes material equivalence as the equality
for propositional values, thus prohibiting multiple “true” or “false” values. Also,
because of the way that we defined A ≡O B , the standard interpretation of “bool” is
forced under our definitions of theoremhood. If A ≡O B were built in as a primitive
operator, then all these clauses would be intuitionistically valid. Because A ≡O B is
¬O((A ⇒O B) ⇒O ¬O(B ⇒O A)) , however, we can derive the characteristic theorem
of classical logic, ¬O¬OP ⇒O P (let A be P and B be tO ).
4.3 Notes on object-level derivability
If we were directly generating object-level proofs in accord with our definition of derivability,
the role of  might cause concern for at least two reasons: it is an infinite function; and it
specifies a type for every variable, failing to exploit the polymorphism of equality that we
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troubled to admit. We do not, however, intend to build a class of object proofs. Instead,
we use derivability by making claims and arguments about it in a metalanguage, and we
interpret [1] as also doing so, in a very restricted formalized metalanguage.
As mentioned above, the fact that  is infinite does not prevent effective recognizability
of theoremhood. Let us now consider the polymorphism concern. Here is a simple, contrived,
book-style assertion:
Assuming Y =O X and V =O U, X =O Y ∧O U =O V.
It is polymorphic, independently, in both the type of X and the type of U . We interpret
it as:
∀r1, r2 : { bool , ind }. () α ` (X =O Y ∧O U =O V )
if Y =O X ∈ α and V =O U ∈ α and () X, Y :: r1 and () U, V :: r2
where we implicitly quantify over the obvious types. The polymorphism of object language
variables is expressed using variables of the metalanguage to range over type expressions.
5 Quantification and Iteration
One of the advances in [1] is its treatment of quantification, which goes beyond the typical
structure reflected in our object syntax. Recall that the object language quantifiers take
only one variable. In the data language, however, we want to include iterations of these
quantifications over lists of variables. Before beginning our formulation of the data language,
we informally introduce notations for these iterated object language quantifiers.
We define iterated quantification by induction over lists of variables, as follows.
(∀Ox¯ R : P ) =
{
R ⇒O P if x¯ is the empty list
(∀Oy. (∀O z¯ R : P )) if x¯ = y.z¯
(∃Ox¯ R : P ) =
{
R ∧O P if x¯ is the empty list
(∃Oy. (∃O z¯ R : P )) if x¯ = y.z¯
Similar to the practice in [1], when R is tO , we may omit it from the notation; for
example, (∃Ox¯ : P ) is an abbreviation for (∃Ox¯ tO : P ) .
The common form of quantifiers is abstracted to a function of four variables, (M xs R :
B) , where variable M:{∧M ,∨M} is a kind of quantifier index. By convention, (∧Mxs R :
B) and (∨M xs R : B) are written as (∀Oxs R : B) and (∃Oxs R : B) , respectively.
They are also defined inductively on variable list xs .
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The motivating idea is that (M v R : B) is the iteration of a binary operator x M y on
the values that B takes for v satisfying R . For a paradigm, consider the interpretation of
(Σv R : B) as (+v R : B) , the iteration of x + y . For instance, assume predicate R.x
holds only on individuals i0 and i1 . Then, as expected, (Σv R.v : f.v) = f(i0) + f(i1) .
Correspondingly, in the treatment of quantifiers in [1], (∃Ov R.v : f.v) = f(i0) ∨O f(i1) ,
and similarly for ∀O .
Part of extending the formalization beyond predicate logic would be to give a semantics
to (M xs R : B) for various other operators M . (Indeed, summation might be part
of a sensible extension.) We require that M be commutative and associative and that B
assumes values other than the identity of M only finitely often on R . In case M does not
have an identity, we further require that R be non-empty; the development in [1] states
that a quantifier expression (M xs R : B) with an empty range gets the value id(M) , the
identity of M .
When the related binary operator and identity are defined with respect to the quantifier,
useful properties can be stated abstractly. For M = ∧M , P M Q is P ∧O Q and id(M)
is tO . Similarly, for M = ∨
M , P M Q is P ∨O Q and id(M) is fO . Using this informal
metalanguage, we may state uniformities such as:
((M xs R : P ) M (M xs R : Q)) =O (M xs R : P M Q).
The calculational style of [1] is designed to exploit such properties.
6 The Data Language
We use the term data language for the expressions of [1] that are directly manipulated by
users. In a more conventional development, the data language would simply be some nota-
tion for proofs whose constituent propositions would be about numbers, lists, sets, functions,
or some other basic domain of interest. We instead propose that the data language of the
book should be understood as a restricted, formalized metalanguage about theoremhood of
an object language. In our opinion, the arguments of [1] (at least after the introduction of
quantification) are most easily read as rather straightforward arguments about the struc-
ture of expressions and derivability. Indeed, our data language does not directly refer to the
object language semantics, only to a class of object theorems. This reflects a critical distinc-
tion: the job of argument about object-level theoremhood belongs to the data language; the
job of addressing mathematical domains of principal interest (lists, numbers, etc.) belongs
to the object language.
This, the data level, is the level at which several atypical features of the calculational logic
of [1] are explained; the object language and object-level derivability were only precursors
to the data language, not domains in which the details of the user level of calculational logic
could be discussed. In this section, we formally present the syntax and semantics of the
data language. We here restrict ourselves to calculational predicate logic, but we anticipated
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eventual extensions to a broader range of the topics in the discrete mathematics text [1],
which influenced some of our design decisions.
6.1 Data language syntax
We intend the data language to adequately represent the language actually used in the book
to discuss object theoremhood. Therefore, its syntax is significantly more involved than that
of our simple, standard object language. Atypical features of calculational logic can be seen
in the generalized treatment of quantification and the relations involving object language
syntax.
Definition. DT is a class of type expressions used in data language quantifiers. It
comprises the constants OV, OE, OT,  , { bool , ind }, and {∧,∨}, and it is closed
under the operators T List and T × T ′. The overloaded notation —OV, OE, etc. de-
note both types and type expressions— should cause no confusion in our explanation.
Context can distinguish types from type expressions when relevant.
(15)
Definition. DV is a denumerable class of identifiers used as data-language variables.
The data language has no function or predicate variables, only variables over (several
different types of) individuals. DE is the class of data-language expressions, comprising
DV and all instances of the following (where a, b, c, ∗, , α∈DE, x∈DV, and t∈DT):
(16)
• Various standard logical operations (including identity): if a then b; a & b; a or b;
not a; a is b; for x : t. a; a iff b .
• Constants and operations for lists and pairs: [ ]; a · b; 〈a, b〉 .
• A predicate denoting list membership: a ∈ b .
• Constants representing object variables: abc (for abcO ∈OV ).
• Various constants and operations for constructing object expressions: a(b); t; f ;
a ⇒ b; a ⇐ b; a = b;¬a; a ≡ b; a ∧ b; a ∨ b; (∗a b : c); a ∗ b; id(∗); a[b := c] .
• Constants for the quantifier indices {∧M ,∨M} : ∧,∨ . (We may write ∀ for ∧ and
∃ for ∨ .)
• Constants and an operation for denoting object type expressions: bool , ind , (a)b .
• A constant for each natural number: 99.
• Operations for various relations involving object syntax:
– Representing object theoremhood: () α ` a .
– Representing typing of object expressions: () a :: b .
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– Updating of environments: ab . Note that we overload this notation, using it for
updating in both the informal metalanguage and the formalized data language.
– Representing assumptions in statements about object theoremhood:
assuming ( ∈ α) a, b .
– Representing that an object variable is free in an object expression: a free in b .
6.2 Semantics of data language types
Before we use the type expressions of DT in our data language semantics, we present a few
preparatory notes.
Definition. The semantics of the type expressions in DT is straightforward. For
t∈DT, [t] is defined as follows:
(17)
[OT] = OT
[OE] = OE
[OV] = OV
[{ bool , ind }] = {bool, ind}
[{∧,∨}] = {∧M ,∨M}
[ ] = 
∀t:DT.([t List] = [t] List)
∀t1, t2:DT.([t1× t2] = [t1]× [t2])
We remind readers about our overloaded notation, previously discussed in definition 15. We
do not expect it to cause confusion.
Definition. We also employ a subtype relation on DT. For t1, t2∈DT, we define
t1 ⊆ t2 as follows:
(18)
OV ⊆ OE
∀t : DT. t ⊆ t
∀t1, t2 : DT.(t1 List) ⊆ (t2 List) if t1 ⊆ t2
∀t1, t2, t3, t4 : DT.(t1× t3) ⊆ (t2× t4) if t1 ⊆ t2 and t3 ⊆ t4
Naturally, this subtype relation on the notations of DT represents actual subtyping, i.e.,
∀t1, t2 : DT. t1 ⊆ t2 ⇒ [t1] ⊆ [t2] .
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6.3 Data language semantics
We define the data language semantics using essentially the same methods as for the object
language. There are differences, such as multiple types of individuals and subtyping, but
we could easily adopt these devices in the object language, too, if we were to extend it.
In the definitions that follow, Type refers to a collection of collections of values.
Definition. A model of the data language is a pair 〈γ, V 〉 where(19)
• γ : DV → Type is a typing environment function.
• V : Πx:DV. γ(x) is a valuation, a function that assigns to each variable x a value in
the type γ(x) .
Definition. The data language semantics is given as a recursive definition of
Dsem(γ, V, A, v, T ) for γ∈DV → Type, V ∈(Πx:DV. γ(x)), A∈DE, T∈Type, v∈T . We in-
tend Dsem(γ, V, A, v, T ) to hold exactly when expression A has type T and value v∈T
under model 〈γ, V 〉. (As with the object language semantics, we elide the arguments
γ and V where it is obvious what is meant.) It is defined according to the following
clauses, where variables range over data expressions unless otherwise specified:
(20)
1. Dsem(A, a, [t2]) if Dsem(A, a, [t1]) and t1 ⊆ t2 .
2. ∀x:DV. Dsem(x, V (x), γ(x)) .
3. Dsem(if P then Q, q if p,
 
) if Dsem(P, p,
 
) and Dsem(Q, q,
 
) ,
and similarly for the other connectives.
4. Dsem(A is B, a = b,
 
) if Dsem(A, a, T ) and Dsem(B, b, T ) .
5. ∀g:[t] →
 
. Dsem((for x : t. a), (∀v:[t].g(v)),
 
) if ∀v:[t].Dsem(γx[t], V
x
v , a, g(v),
 
) .
6. ∀T :Type. Dsem([ ], nil, T List) ; note the type polymorphism.
7. Dsem(A · B, the concatenation of a to b, T List)
if Dsem(A, a, T ) and Dsem(B, b, T List) .
8. Dsem(〈A, B〉, 〈a, b〉, T1× T2) if Dsem(A, a, T1) and Dsem(B, b, T2) .
9. Dsem(abc, abcO ,OV) ; similarly for other object variable literals.
10. Dsem(t, tO ,OE) and Dsem(f , fO ,OE) .
11. Dsem(A ≡ B, a ≡O b,OE) if Dsem(A, a,OE) and Dsem(B, b, OE) ;
similarly for other OE -constructors.
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12. Dsem((∗X R : P ), (M x r : p),OE)
if Dsem(X, x,OV List) and Dsem(R, r,OE)
and Dsem(P, p,OE) and Dsem(∗, M, {∧M ,∨M}) .
13. Dsem(A[X := B], axb ,OE)
if Dsem(A, a, OE) and Dsem(B, b, OE) and Dsem(X, x,OV) ,
where axb is a capture-avoiding substitution function on object expressions. (Fully
specifying a textual substitution function for our purposes would be tedious and un-
necessary.)
14. And similarly for other operators that denote object expressions, quantifier indices,
object type expressions, numeric constants, etc.
Before continuing with the semantics for the remaining elements of data language syntax
—the operators that denote relations involving object syntax— we introduce an auxiliary
device. To simplify the data language, we have avoided introducing function types. So, in
our data language, we will use lists of pairs to refer indirectly to assignments of object type
expressions to object variables. We introduce here a simple “  to OV → OT ” notation
that maps a list  to a function; unmatched variables are mapped to bool ∈OT so we may
consider the resulting function as total.
• ∀:(OV×OT) List.( to OV → OT) ∈OV → OT .
• ∀x:OV, t:OT, :(OV×OT) List.((〈x, t〉, ) to OV → OT)(x) = t .
• ∀x, y:OV, t:OT, :(OV×OT) List.
((〈x, t〉, ) to OV → OT)(y) = ( to OV → OT)(y) if ¬(x = y) .
• ∀x:OV.([ ] to OV → OT)(x) = bool .
We now proceed with the remaining clauses of the data language semantics.
15. Dsem(() α ` P , (vts to OV → OT) as ` p,
 
)
if Dsem(, vts, (OV×OT) List) and Dsem(α, as,OE List) and Dsem(P, p,OE) .
16. Dsem(() A :: B, (vts to OV → OT) a :: T ,
 
)
if Dsem(, vts, (OV×OT) List) and Dsem(A, a,OE List) and Dsem(B, T,OT) .
17. Dsem(XB , (〈x, T 〉, vts),OV×OT List)
if Dsem(, vts, (OV×OT) List) and Dsem(X, x,OV) and Dsem(B, T,OT) .
18. Dsem((assuming ( ∈ α) P, Q), p ∈ as ⇒ q,
 
)
if Dsem(α, as,OE List) and Dsem(P, p,OE) and Dsem(Q, q,
 
) .
19. Dsem(X free in A, variable x occurs free in some member of a ,
 
)
if Dsem(X, x,OV) and Dsem(A, a,OE List) .
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This is a conventional first-order semantics, and things are generally as one would expect.
For instance, clauses 1 and 2 state that subtypes and data language models behave in the
expected ways, clause 6 gives the expected (polymorphic) meaning to the empty list, etc. We
omitted many clauses that would be included in an exhaustive presentation; these omitted
clauses, however, do not require any additional semantic machinery.
Clauses 3 and 4 are examples of our treatment of logical operators typically written
in natural language, like “if . . . then” and “is”, metalinguistic operators used to discuss
mathematics. We claim that the calculational logic of [1] can be read as a formalized
metalanguage, however, with these operators as part of the data language. There is also a
temptation to confuse OE -constructors with data-level logical operations. For instance, the
OE -constructor A ⇒ B is different from the data-level logical operation if P then Q ; the
former is an OE -valued operation on expressions of type OE and the latter is an operation
on
 
. Similar distinctions apply for the OE -valued A∧B and the
 
-valued P & Q , etc.
Our syntax and semantics omitted a few expressions that appear in [1] that are easily
definable in terms of the language we presented. For instance, (X :OV free in A:OE List)
is extended to the data-level predicate occurs(V :OV List, E:OE List) , which holds when
some V ′ in V is such that (V free in E) . It is typically negated, as not occurs(V, E) to
indicate none of the variables referred to by elements of V occur free in any expression
referred to by an element of E . Updating of type expression environments is also implicitly
extended to lists: for X :OV List and r:OT , Xr denotes a copy of :(OV×OT) List with
all variables on X updated to type expression r . It can be easily defined in terms of the
single-variable version. We believe it is clear how to incorporate such simple extensions into
our formal framework, and we consider them to be in our data language for the purpose of
examples in section 7.
Relatedly, we have not been explicit about certain conventions in [1] that are merely
a matter of display. For instance, clause 18 of the semantics indicates that “assuming” is
essentially implication, as expected. In practice, it is only used in the context of object
theoremhood judgments and the “ ( ∈ α) ” notation is elided; it specifies that a particular
expression is included among the assumptions, making our notation look like that of the
book [1]. We can use the more general “ if . . . then ” instead of the “assuming” display form,
if it improves readability. As another example, a three element list might be written in the
standard notation “ a, b, c ”, and a singleton list is written simply as its element. All essential
details of the formation of lists are present in that representation and expressible in the data
language. Similarly, when the types of f and x are clear from context, we may write f.x
instead of f(x) for the OE -valued constructor of object-language function applications.
Notational conversions of this sort only occur for easily understood standard notation, and
they should not pose difficulties for readers. Unless otherwise explained, standard notations
have their expected meanings.
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7 Using the Data Language
Our goal in this paper is to demonstrate how calculational predicate logic (as presented in
chapters 3, 8, and 9 of [1]) could be easily read as a restricted, formalized metalanguage.
We have formalized this data language, and we have also already illustrated the use of the
data language with our treatment of the proof of Theorem Change of Dummy. We do not
attempt to formalize the actual proof structure used in [1]; we expect that the conventional
semantics of our data language makes it clear that one can do so.
In this section, we provide concrete examples of how material from the text can be ex-
pressed and read using our data language; the names and numbers labeling our examples
are taken directly from the text [1]. Our motivation for providing these examples is two-
fold. Foremost, we demonstrate that our data language is adequate for calculational logic
by using it to express various theorems and inference rules that were chosen to illustrate
the full range of the calculational logic language; in particular, we formalize the component
propositions of the proof of Theorem Change Of Dummy, so readers can compare our met-
alinguistic treatment with the text from [1]. Equally importantly, we provide examples of
the propositions and inferences used in calculational logic. By showing detailed represen-
tations of the propositions, readers can see that inferences from one to another could be
formalized in conventional ways.
7.1 Theorems
Here we present data language expressions for a few objects classified as theorems in [1]. In
that text, typically only the notation that looks like standard predicate logic is presented
as the theorem; for instance, the first theorem below, Identity of ∨ , is simply given
as P ∨ f ≡ P . Here, we give full explanations of the meanings of these common (in
[1]) theorems, brief examples to illustrate the scope and adequacy of our formalized data
language. In particular, we include the theorems cited in the proof of Theorem Change of
Dummy (Fig. 1) among our examples.
• (3.30) Identity of ∨ . For  : (OV×OT) List, α:OE List, P :OE.
if () P :: bool & () α :: bool then () α ` P ∨ f ≡ P .
• (3.35) Golden Rule. For  : (OV×OT) List, α:OE List, P, Q:OE.
if () P, Q :: bool & () α :: bool then () α ` P ∧Q ≡ P ≡ Q ≡ P ∨Q .
(Recall that the boolean operator ≡ is associative.)
• (3.84a) Substitution. For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, r:{ bool , ind },
z:OV, e, f, P :OE.
if () α :: bool & () e, f :: r & (zr) P :: bool
then () α ` (e = f) ∧ P [z := e] ≡ (e = f) ∧ P [z := f ] .
• (8.14) One-point rule. For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, ∗:{∧,∨}, x:OV, E, P :OE.
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if not occurs(x, E) & () α :: bool & () E :: ind & (xind) P :: bool
then () α ` (∗x x = E : P ) = P [x := E] .
• (8.20) Nesting. For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, ∗:{∧,∨}, r:{ bool , ind },
x, y:OV, P, Q, R:OE.
if not occurs(y, R) & () α :: bool & (x,y
ind
) P, Q, R :: bool
then () α ` (∗x, y R ∧Q : P ) = (∗x R : (∗y Q : P )) .
• (9.2) Trading. For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, x:OV, P, R:OE.
if () α :: bool & (xind) P, R :: bool then () α ` (∀x R : P ) ≡ (∀x : R ⇒ P ) .
7.2 Inference rules
The statements identified in [1] as calculational logic inference rules express a relationship
between object-level theoremhood judgments; typically, they have the form “Provided cer-
tain syntactic constraints hold on P and Q , if P is an object theorem, then Q is an
object theorem”, where P, Q refer to object expressions. Statements like these are readily
expressed using the data language. Here, we present data-language re-statements of three
calculational logic inference rules, a “Leibniz” rule that permits textual substitution into
the body of quantifiers, the “Transitivity” rule of equality-derivability employed in the proof
of Theorem Change of Dummy, and an ≡ -elimination rule called “Equanimity”.
• Leibniz.
For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, ∗:{∧,∨},
Z:OV, X :OV List, A, B, P, R:OE, r:{ bool , ind }.
if not occurs(X, α) &
(Xind) α ` (R ⇒ A = B) &
(Xind) A, B :: r &
(X,Z
ind,r
) P :: bool
then () α ` (∗X R : P [Z := A]) = (∗X R : P [Z := B])
• Transitivity.
For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, P, Q, R:OE.
if () α ` P = Q &
() α ` Q = R
then () α ` P = R
• Equanimity.
For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, P, Q:OE.
if () α ` P &
() α ` P ≡ Q
then () α ` Q
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7.3 Proof content
One of the critical requirements for the data language is that it be adequate for expressing
the component propositions of calculational proofs in [1]. Here, as a demonstration of
adequacy, we present the central component propositions of the proof of Theorem Change
of Dummy (see Fig. 1). Other proofs in [1] can be read similarly.
For the first proposition, we are explicit in universally closing the proposition and list-
ing all the components of the antecedent, including the “assuming” construct. For other
propositions, we omit these details for a more concise presentation, but the statements are
to be considered closed under the appropriate universal quantification and guarded by the
same antecedent. We can judge data language adequacy in part by their similarities to the
notation in [1] also used in Fig. 1. Note that the similarities would be even greater if we
systematically abbreviated () α ` P to simply P .
This subsection also provides the most direct support for our claim that, although we
do not formalize a proof structure for calculational logic in this paper, it could be done in
a straightforward way. Using inference rules and theorems like those previously presented
as data-language expressions, there are no unusual elements in the inferences from one
proposition to the next. A detailed account of these inferences, however, is unnecessary to
support the goals and claims of this paper.
In the following, note that ∗ is a variable of the data language.
1. For :(OV×OT) List, α:OE List, ∗:{∧,∨}, P, R:OE, f, f−1, x, y:OV.
assuming ( ∈ α) (∗x, y t : x = f.y ≡ y = f−1.x),
if (xind) R, P :: bool &
() α :: bool &
(x,y
ind
) f, f−1 :: (1)ind &
not occurs(y, [R, P ]) &
not (x is y) &
not occurs([x, y], α)
then () α ` (∗y R[x := f.y] : P [x := f.y]) = (∗y R[x := f.y] : (∗x x = f.y : P ))
2. () α ` (∗y R[x := f.y] : (∗x x = f.y : P )) = (∗x, y R[x := f.y] ∧ x = f.y : P )
3. () α ` (∗x, y R[x := f.y] ∧ x = f.y : P ) = (∗x, y R[x := x] ∧ x = f.y : P )
4. () α ` (∗x, y R[x := x] ∧ x = f.y : P ) = (∗x R : (∗y x = f.y : P ))
5. () α ` (∗x R : (∗y x = f.y : P )) = (∗x R : (∗y y = f−1.x : P ))
6. () α ` (∗x R : (∗y y = f−1.x : P )) = (∗x R : P [y := f−1.x])
7. () α ` (∗x R : P [y := f−1.x]) = (∗x R : P )
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8 Conclusion and Discussion
By formalizing a metalinguistic interpretation of the language of the calculational logic of
[1], we believe we have provided:
• A sensible, thorough reading for the language of calculational logic, using only con-
ventional semantic methods
• Meanings for the propositions manipulated by users of calculational logic, providing
evidence that there is nothing unusual about the inferences needed for calculational
logic
• A framework in which one can evaluate the extent to which calculational logic is
non-standard
We conclude the paper by discussing each of these issues and how we have addressed them.
For this section, it will be helpful if readers have read some of the examples of the data
language (in section 7), but it is not necessary to be thoroughly familiar with that section.
8.1 Justifying calculational logic
Using the examples from section 7 as support, we feel the technical content of this paper is
an adequate basis for justifying calculational logic. We explained the language of calcula-
tional logic using only standard, well-understood semantic methods. The semantics we gave
resulted in a sensible reading of the predicate logic in [1], and it can be extended to account
for more of the discrete mathematics in that text.
There may be ways to formally justify calculational logic that are fundamentally different
from ours. (There are certainly other ways to give an object language and a definition of
object theoremhood, but these descriptions are not fundamental to our justification.) We
simply intended to give one such justification, some foundation to the method.
It was not immediately clear to us that such a reading could be given at all. The com-
bination of elements of object language and metalanguage in the formal logic of [1] made it
seem possible that calculational logic was entirely heuristic, a method for constructing argu-
ments that would not withstand the detailed investigation of formalization. This possibility
can now be discounted.
8.2 Calculational logic inferences
The inferences of calculational logic may seem odd based on the typical calculational proof
structure presented in [1]. We provided evidence to the contrary; in fact, they are very
straightforward and can be easily understood. Any confusion about the inferences may
have arisen from confusion about the meanings of the propositions involved, a failure to
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distinguish object-level from meta-level. The inference from proposition P to proposition
Q can indeed be difficult to understand without knowing what propositions P and Q
really are.
It would be both tiresome and outside the scope of the paper to fully formalize calcu-
lational logic inference. For instance, we would need to formalize all the facts about how
to deduce the correctness of a typing claim “ () A :: T ” from other typing claims, and
we would need to formalize many facts about object theoremhood to support deductions of
one object theoremhood claim α ` P from other similar claims. Such facts can be readily
grasped, expressed, and applied using standard methods, however, given our clarification of
the propositions underlying calculational logic.
The proof structure of calculational logic can also be readily understood, in the context
of the fundamental inferences, and we do not discuss it here.
8.3 Is calculational logic non-standard?
When interpreted in a traditional framework for first-order predicate logic (with equality
and function symbols), the calculational logic in [1] is readily seen to be non-standard in
the following ways:
1. Identifiers don’t have fixed types.
2. P = Q is a proposition even for propositions P, Q .
3. There is (limited) type polymorphism. For example, A = A is a theorem whether A
is an expression of type boolean or individual.
4. Quantifier expressions are treated abstractly in two ways:
(a) the choice of underlying quantifier ( ∀ or ∃ )
(b) the number of quantified variables (i.e., not necessarily just one variable)
5. Textual substitution E[V := P ] appears in theorems.
We interpret calculational logic in a different way: as a metalogic, in which (for instance)
the operation P ∨ Q refers not to the ordinary disjunction operation on truth values, but to
a term-constructor, denoting an expression which itself stands for disjunction in a separate
object language. Under this interpretation, we account for the first two of the features
enumerated above as slightly non-standard choices for the object language. In contrast,
the remainder are explained as phenomena of the formalized metalanguage. As this paper
demonstrates, all can be readily formalized using only conventional metalinguistic semantic
techniques.
With the clarifications provided by our formalization of calculational logic, we also ex-
posed several elements not apparent in the presentation in [1]. They are listed in our
24
data language syntax among the operations involving object syntax: representations of ob-
ject theoremhood, typing of object expressions, updating environments, and representing
assumptions in object theoremhood judgments. Some of these operations may seem non-
standard in the context of conventional first-order logics, but in the context of calculational
logic —intended to permit reasoning about the typically metalinguistic operation of textual
substitution— they are readily seen as formalizations of common or necessary aspects of
inference. Furthermore, we have shown that these operations, too, can be formalized in
straightforward ways.
Interestingly, even though an operation representing object-level theoremhood is not
explicitly present in the formulas designated as theorems in [1], it is explicitly used in state-
ments designated as metatheorems. Readers of [1] may notice that theorems and metathe-
orems seem to be smoothly integrated in the same logical system. Our interpretation of
calculational logic accounts for that by suggesting they are essentially the same: all the
theorems in the book are metatheorems, about theoremhood in some other object language.
It is therefore unsurprising that these two apparently disparate levels can be effectively
integrated; they are not different levels at all.
From the calculational proof structure given in [1], it initially seemed that there could be
a considerable need for non-standard semantic methods underlying the unusual appearance
of calculational logic. In fact, no unconventional semantic devices are necessary to interpret
calculational logic as a metalogic. Perhaps most satisfyingly to supporters of the calcula-
tional method, a straightforward metalinguistic formalization of calculational logic renders
even its non-standard elements readily explained by standard semantic methods.
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